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In his Modern Spain 1875-1980, Raymond Carr wrote that “in all countries 
of Southern and Eastern Europe the strains imposed by the Great War of 1914-
1918 proved too great for democratic and quasi-democratic regimes.”1 While 
undoubtedly true, these words should not be read to mean that the war was nec-
essarily a catastrophe imposed by the Great Powers on these countries: Many 
within them saw the generalized European war – the result of the existing alliance 
system which turned an Austrian-Serbian dispute into something very different 
– as a unique historic opportunity to be seized in order to pursue concrete, often 
expansionist, goals. Interventionism, in other words, was a policy choice freely 
pursued. When the First World War began officially, on 28 July 1914, the countries 
of southern Europe were by no means unaccustomed to armed conflict. Whether 
in the colonial sphere (in the cases of Portugal, Spain, and Italy) or against one 
or more European powers (in the cases of Italy and Greece), all four of the coun-
tries covered in this article had recently been engaged in sometimes defensive, but 
more often than not aggressive, military action – so much so that the chronologi-
cal limits of the First World War are beginning, in the opinion of many historians 
– to fray at the edges, not because of actions undertaken by the Great Powers, 
but because of the activities undertaken by their southern neighbours.2 All four 
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countries would indeed find it impossible to contain the internal political, socio-
economic and cultural tensions unleashed by the war which, beginning in the 
Balkans, quickly spread across Europe, from France and Belgium to Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire, and beyond. These countries willingly brought difficulties onto 
themselves, since interventionist figures saw in the war a shortcut to the fulfil-
ment of their hopes for territorial aggrandizement, domestic political ascendancy, 
and a new status among the victorious nations, acting sometimes with astonishing 
recklessness, whatever the opinion of others. The consequences of this “pre-war” 
situation would, in all four cases (even if Spain was to remain neutral), have a 
dramatic impact on wartime and post-war politics. Erez Manela has written elo-
quently of a “Wilsonian Moment” in 1919, when the eyes of the colonial world 
turned to the American President in the hope that, at the Paris Peace Conference, 
he might deliver self-determination.3 There was a similar moment of shared cross-
border euphoria which began in 1914: an “interventionist moment”, extensible 
to other countries as well (Bulgaria and Romania, both of which would enter the 
war voluntarily), when the nations of southern and eastern Europe awoke to new 
possibilities and dreamed of a different future for themselves in a Europe – and an 
Africa and an Asia Minor – whose borders had been redrawn and whose balance 
of power had been fundamentally altered. The purpose of this article is to posit 
the existence of this “interventionist moment” and to suggest, through a compari-
son of four countries, its broad parameters.
Italy entered the war in 1915; Portugal in 1916, and Greece (officially) in 
1917. Spain did not intervene, although the possibility of doing so was envisaged 
on a number of occasions, notably under the stewardship of Liberal leader count 
Romanones (1915-1917). All three that entered the war did so on the Allied side 
and, should Spain have joined the conflict, it would have followed suit. Most late-
comers did; only Bulgaria bucked this trend. All four countries were the subject of 
intense propaganda and related covert activity by both the Allies and the Central 
Powers, either to join one of the coalitions or at least to remain neutral. Informal 
and formal contacts were maintained by the belligerents’ official and unofficial 
representatives with an enormous range of personalities, from crowned heads of 
state to anarchists, all in the hope of swaying the political decision-makers one 
way or another, whatever the cost to the neutral country’s internal stability and 
future prospects. In the cases of Italy and Greece, moreover, promises made by 
the Allies included irresponsible guarantees of territorial aggrandizement at the 
expense of the defeated foes, in a manner ill-befitting a war waged for Law, Civi-
lization, and the rights of small nations.4 But it was not just foreign meddling 
(diplomatic contacts at the highest levels of decision-making, subventions to 
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interventionist newspapers such as Benito Mussolini's Il Popolo d’Italia, money 
distributed among professional revolutionaries) that was to shake these countries 
to the core. Such interference – the “German gold” so often encountered in Por-
tuguese documents5 – raised political violence to unprecedented heights and, in 
the case of Greece, brought about the terrible “national schism”. By 1916, Greece 
had two governments, one in Athens and the other in Salonika, pursuing totally 
different foreign and domestic policies. Politicians in all four countries identified 
the war as an epoch-defining event, a unique window of opportunity which could 
not be missed either by themselves, their political party, and their country, in 
order to fulfil their wildest ambitions. In this regard, foreign interference merely 
fell on already fertile soil, since interventionism and anti-interventionism, cur-
rents present in all four countries of southern Europe had, first and foremost, 
domestic origins. This is all the more striking given both the speed with which the 
war had become a strategic stalemate and the level of casualties being endured by 
the combatant nations. The short-war mirage that had gripped the combatants 
in 1914 – the idea that the troops would be home by Christmas – was indeed a 
powerful one, and lasted well into 1916, despite mounting evidence to the con-
trary. Time and time again, the “latecomers” entered the war only to find that their 
armies were totally unprepared for what awaited them, and that all they managed 
to achieve was the creation of a new stalemate.
It is important, given the aim and comparative nature of this article, to con-
sider the interventionist current in each of the four countries being discussed.6 
The Portuguese Republic was a mere four years old by the time war was declared. 
The country’s diplomacy rested on the ancient alliance with Great Britain, gener-
ally understood to represent the ultimate guarantor of Portuguese independence 
and territorial integrity. Ironically, though, Britain had been traditionally identi-
fied by many of the republicans now in power as a colonial rival which exercised an 
unwanted and humiliating protectorate over Portugal and its overseas domains.7 
In August 1914, the Portuguese parliament was very quick to proclaim its will-
ingness to stand by Great Britain should she ever require Portugal’s help in the 
conflict. When such a request arrived in October 1914, the government – an inde-
pendent cabinet led by Bernardino Machado brought into being at the close of 
1913 to reconcile warring republican factions and to hold free and fair elections 
– found it impossible to mobilize the division it promised the Allies. This was due 
to the poor state of the army and the need to defend Portugal’s colonies, where 
a series of border clashes with German forces had already occurred.8 As a result, 
the matter was momentarily parked, Portugal remaining a non-belligerent. For 
interventionists such as Afonso Costa, leader of the Democratic party, the largest 
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in Portugal, this was unacceptable; the party withdrew its confidence from the 
cabinet and forced its resignation. Interventionists, be they politicians, military 
men, or intellectuals, presented the war as a desirable course of action because 
of a number of reasons. Firstly, the European war was portrayed as a progressive 
and even humanitarian cause, insofar as the triumph over Prussian militarism and 
political reaction would lead to a better world, and indeed, possibly the end of war 
itself. Secondly, intervention was deemed essential for the defence of Portuguese 
territory in Africa, on which the country’s future was seen to depend (there being 
few voices that criticized Portuguese colonialism from the same progressive and 
humanitarian standpoint). Finally, the war would play a part in the stabilization 
and strengthening of the republican regime, whose existence since 1910 had been 
a troubled one.9 Interventionists in Portugal, to be found on the left of the politi-
cal spectrum, were generally content with their regime, believing that through 
the Republic the traditional enemies of the people had been put to flight; there 
remained now the task of doing the same throughout Europe in order to usher in 
a new age. This opinion, arrived at in the first weeks of the conflict, did not change 
as the fighting evolved into the stalemate of trench warfare. Interventionists did 
not believe that what Portugal could bring to this stalemate was something that 
should be debated publicly.
The ensuing government, largely Democratic, was designed to achieve three 
ends: defend the regime from all enemies; hold elections (keeping in mind that 
traditionally, in Portugal, those in power won elections, as a result of which no 
party was trusted by the rest to organize them); and, finally, take the steps neces-
sary to bring Portugal into the conflict, by preparing the required military force. 
Weakened by serious doubts about its constitutional legality, it was blown off 
course by the army, a corporation which did not enjoy a happy relationship with 
the regime and whose officer corps chose this delicate moment to protest against 
civilian interference in barracks life, as well as politically motivated promotions 
and appointments. Because of its timing, the army’s dramatic protest clearly set 
out to derail the interventionist programme.10 The President of the Republic, 
deviating ever further from constitutional practice, invited a trusted old friend, 
General Pimenta de Castro, to restore calm and hold impartial elections. Pimenta 
de Castro, who had no intention of intervening in the European war, but who 
continued to cooperate with Britain when asked, was immediately described as 
a traitor and a dictator by the Democrats. Before elections could be held, a very 
violent revolution overthrew Pimenta de Castro on 14 May 1915, paving the way 
for rapid elections overseen by the Democratic party and as a result, an absolute 
majority in both houses of parliament by that same formation, which completed a 
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sweep of political offices by electing their candidate, Bernardino Machado to the 
Presidency of the Republic. All that remained now, as far as the interventionists 
were concerned, was for London to renew its invitation for Portugal to enter the 
conflict. To make sure that this time Portugal could respond, steps were taken to 
assemble and train a division. The months passed, however, and no such invita-
tion arose – until at last, early in 1916, London informed Lisbon that henceforth 
British shipping would be reserved for Allied use, suggesting simultaneously that 
Portugal make use of German vessels which, at the start of the conflict, had found 
refuge in Portuguese waters. Afonso Costa’s government, having secured a pledge 
from London that the seizure of the ships would constitute an act carried out in 
accordance with the ancient alliance, then ordered a military operation to seize 
the nearly eighty ships scattered from Lisbon to the Far East, eschewing any nego-
tiation with Berlin over the matter; war, predictably, was the result.
What should be remembered in the context of this article is the bitterness 
of the debate over intervention, the frustration felt by interventionists over not 
being able to go to war at a moment of their choosing (such as the December 
1914 clash with German forces at Naulila, in southern Angola) and the wounds 
inflicted as a result on the republican body politic. Equally important was the 
undisguised hostility of much of the officer corps towards the interventionist 
cause, which threatened to send the Army to the Western Front for as yet unclear 
reasons. All the talk of a redemptive blood sacrifice naturally made those who 
would be called upon to make it nervous – but these warning signals were not 
heeded by the interventionists.
Italy saw the shortest, but by no means least intense, interventionist debate.11 
It is also the best known of these debates among international scholars, given 
Italy’s significant part in the war and the important role played by Benito Mus-
solini12 in the interventionist crisis. Italy, of course, was a member of the Triple 
Alliance (renewed as late as December 1912) but, not having been consulted by 
either Vienna or Berlin during the July Crisis, it decided to remain neutral. Italy 
was still recovering from the so-called “red week” of June, when peasant agitation 
and clashes with landowner-backed militias set fire to the provinces of Romagna 
and Emilia, the army being forced to restore peace. When we consider Portu-
guese intervention in the conflict and compare it to Italy’s, we are struck by the 
diversity of motivations and actors in the latter case. In Italy there were multi-
ple interventionisms, all vying for Allied and popular attention, and frequently 
contradictory in their ultimate intentions. In the Italian case, we are forced to 
consider, for example, the state of mind of leading ministers – Prime Minister 
Antonio Salandra and, after October 1914, Foreign Minister Sydney Sonnino. 
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In the summer, Sonnino had publicly called on Italy to join its allies in the fight 
but he subsequently changed his mind, thanks to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan 
and Austria-Hungary’s own difficulties. This was revealed that same month when 
Salandra, addressing Italian diplomats, described his actions as being guided by 
sacred egoism.13 Salandra and Sonnino looked forward to war, seeing it as a means 
of expanding Italy’s borders while twinning the resulting mass patriotism with 
their narrow and elitist vision of Italian politics, thus defeating both their rival 
in the Liberal party, Giovanni Giolitti, and the mass movements now appearing, 
specially on the Left. Meanwhile, a largely venal press stood open to subventions 
from the large industrial concerns which hoped to drive Italy into the conflict so 
that lucrative war contracts might follow. On the extreme Right, stood nationalists 
and their supporting coterie of artists and intellectuals with Marinetti’s Futur-
ists and Gabriele D’Annunzio at their head.14 For these men, war would purify 
and rejuvenate Italy, allowing it to make a clean start without all the dead weight 
accumulated over centuries of subservience to others. These intellectuals did not 
lack contempt for democratic politics, liberal values, and the rising working class, 
identified as a domestic enemy. 
But it was not just the Right that was demanding war; many on the Left 
were also calling for intervention, for reasons which would have been intelligi-
ble to their Portuguese counterparts. Radicals and republicans were lured by the 
thought of fighting alongside the democracies against the old order, believing that 
this would in some way bring about the democratization of Italian politics. For 
many of these men, moreover, the old Mazzinian fire still burned bright, and they 
were not insensible to what they perceived as the cries of Italia irredenta. Further 
still to the Left, revolutionary syndicalists like Alceste de Ambris and Filippo Cor-
ridoni saw the war as a revolutionary event: once the people had tasted power 
– by having a gun in their hand – and had come to understand that there was 
more to the world than their village and their plot of land, they would be radical-
ized and brought into the modern age, becoming an unstoppable political force. 
By November 1914, having broken with the Italian Socialist Party, Mussolini was 
firmly in the interventionist camp. 
In other words, while the Government and its backers were working towards 
war in order to stabilize the political situation through territorial conquest, most 
other interventionists were working towards war in order to overthrow that same 
situation, with different levels of radicalism. In February 1915, the Italian govern-
ment sent an emissary to London to open negotiations on the subject of Italian 
intervention.15 There was only one issue to be resolved: what would Italy receive 
from its participation in the conflict? The gains eventually promised in the Pact 
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of London, signed secretly on 26 April, were considerable: Trent and Trieste, the 
Cisalpine Tyrol, part of Dalmatia and its islands (but not Fiume), and a share of 
Ottoman territory. Italy’s disputed claim to the Dodecanese was recognized.16 In 
the Pact, Italy promised to be at war in one month’s time. Only on 4 May did 
Salandra renounce membership of the Triple Alliance. Other ministers did not 
know what was happening and neither did the army, which was not asked to take 
steps to prepare for the coming conflict. The King eventually approved the Pact 
and signed it. It is worth pausing for a second at this point: Italy went to war 
because of the actions of a small handful of men, acting on their own initiative 
– men who knew, courtesy of police and prefects’ reports, that the country as a 
whole did not want war. Giolitti’s Liberals, Socialists, Catholics: all were united in 
opposing Italian participation in the conflict, and all understood that there was no 
direct threat to Italy from either side. In his Dynamic of Destruction, Alan Kramer 
writes, “While ordinary Italians rejected violence for the sake of violence, Salandra 
embraced it, deliberately flouting the will of the majority in a show of decisive-
ness. He aimed to destroy the Giolittian system, split and defeat the Socialists, and 
integrate political Catholicism through war.”17 The politics of pre-war Italy were 
indeed finished, but not in the way Salandra hoped. We should not simply see in 
Salandra the embodiment of bellicose Italy and in Giolitti a committed pacifist. As 
war broke out in Europe, Italy had 60,000 soldiers deployed in Libya, containing 
the local insurgency. They had not been sent there by Salandra but by Giolitti, in 
an act of imperial aggrandizement (with a degree of social imperialism thrown in) 
with untold consequences, and under the most spurious of motives – Ottoman 
neglect of the territory.18 Surprised by an Arab insurrection against their pres-
ence, the Italians reacted with ever greater fury; encouraged by Italy’s example, 
the Balkan states also turned to war, first against an obviously enfeebled Ottoman 
Empire, and then among themselves for the spoils.
Greece was the last of the three countries to enter the war, but the one which 
suffered most as a result of the interventionist crisis. In 1910 Eleftherios Veni-
zelos, the Cretan-born leader of the Liberal party, became prime minister; behind 
him stood the professional and commercial sectors of the Greek middle classes.19 
The Balkan wars (1912-13) had seen the emergence in Greece – and the surround-
ing states – of a distinct war culture, bringing together nationalist, cultural, and 
religious elements. In this the Balkan Wars prefaced the European War about to 
start, down to the blurring of the distinction between combatants and non-com-
batants.20 Greek troops participated in well documented and reported atrocities 
against Bulgarians, Muslims and Jews in and around Salonika;21 the once homog-
enous nation, like its neighbours, had now incorporated significant minorities, 
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whose presence it did not desire. A report by the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace, conducted in the aftermath of these conflicts, apportioned blame 
for the atrocities to all participants. 
In the aftermath of the Balkan Wars, the eyes of Greece’s nationalist sectors, 
at the heart of which stood the aforementioned Liberal party, turned to “irre-
dentist Greece”: northern Epirus (southern Albania), scattered Aegean islands 
and those parts of Asia Minor which, under Ottoman rule, housed sizable Greek 
populations. Upon the outbreak of the Great War, Venizelos, dreaming of this 
“Greater Greece”, and articulating almost messianic thoughts of a Greek rebirth22, 
met with the British minister in Athens and offered him an army of 250,000 men, 
the Greek fleet, and access to his country’s ports – but London, wary of pro-
voking Greece’s rival, Bulgaria, into joining the Central Powers, played for time. 
Eventually the Foreign Office would alter its stance, trying to hammer out a deal. 
Bulgaria, in return for neutrality, would receive Greek-held Kavalla. Greece would 
be compensated with, among other things, northern Epirus, Smyrna and the sur-
rounding Anatolian territory (although no specific details of the exchange were 
worked out). 
Greek interventionism was thus based on nationalist and expansionist aspi-
rations, for the most part the preserve of Venizelos’s Liberals, located on the left 
of Greek constitutional politics. Not everyone was convinced by Venizelos’ vision: 
the Court, royalists, and “old politicians” (those in power before Venizelos’s arrival 
from Crete) understood that Venizelos’ success meant their doom. They distrusted 
British promises on the matter of Smyrna, and were by no means convinced that 
the Allies would win the war (this was also the case among many leading officers, 
including future dictator Ioannis Metaxas, then acting Chief of the General Staff, 
who had studied in Germany). Anti-interventionists could not countenance the 
surrender of any Greek territory, no matter how recently acquired, in return for 
hypothetical gains elsewhere, and would agree to war only if Greece was com-
pletely protected from invasion, and the Ottoman empire was dissolved, after an 
Allied victory. The resulting clash between the two groups would be known as the 
“national schism”, and its consequences would be tremendous. Remarkably, and 
unlike Afonso Costa, Venizelos was able to win elections on an interventionist 
ticket while in opposition. 
Greece’s wartime trials and tribulations are too complicated to detail here. 
Suffices to say that, thwarted by King Constantine, Venizelos and his support-
ers launched a Committee of National Defence, or Ethniki Amyna (from October 
1916 onwards termed a provisional government), which raised its own army of 
60,000 men and declared war on the Central Powers, contributing to the defence 
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of Salonika, occupied since 1915 by the Allies. The rival administrations con-
trolled their own portion of Greece, King Constantine strongest in the older part 
of the country and Venizelos strongest in the islands and the “new” territories. 
Meanwhile, relations between the King and the Allies deteriorated rapidly, so that 
in June 1917, after a blockade of Greek ports and a number of violent incidents, 
Constantine was expelled to Switzerland by the Allies and replaced by Crown 
Prince George, his second son. A triumphant Venizelos returned to Athens and 
formally declared war on the Central Powers. Addressing the so-called “Lazarus 
Chamber”, recalled after its earlier dissolution by the King, Venizelos explained 
his actions: “Greece knows that I have never promised her anything unattainable. 
Greece knows that I have never failed to keep my word. By taking part in this 
world war alongside democracies impelled to unite in a holy alliance […] we shall 
regain the national territories we have lost; we shall reassert our national honour; 
we shall effectively defend our national interests at the Peace Congress and secure 
our national future. We shall be a worthy member of the family of free nations 
that the Congress will organise, and hand on to our children the Greece that past 
generations could only think of.”
Finally, we come to the country that resisted the interventionist temptation, 
but which was nevertheless deeply affected by what might be described as “pre-
war” tensions: Spain.23 When the First World War started, Spain was governed 
by a Conservative party government led by Eduardo Dato. This was a weak cabi-
net, since it rested on a smaller majority than was the norm in Spain, and had to 
worry about defections of its backbenchers to Conservative rival Antonio Mau-
ra’s own parliamentary group. This government immediately declared Spain’s 
neutrality in the conflict. After all, who could Spain fight, with its inefficient, 
top-heavy army and exposed shores? According to Francisco Romero Salvadó, 
most of the “dynastic” politicians, whose two parties, Liberals and Conservatives, 
had governed Spain for decades, were opposed to intervention in the conflict, 
recognizing “her political and diplomatic isolation as well as the economic weak-
ness and military disorganization of the country” – to which could be added the 
hope of emerging as the promoter of peace in case of a military stalemate.24 This 
does not help us to understand why Spanish politicians were able to reach this 
apparently enlightened conclusion when others around them saw in war a trans-
formational event: after all, Portugal’s diplomatic isolation was not smaller, her 
military no more effective, and her economy no more productive. But Romero 
Salvadó also writes, “the most Germanophile voices in the country were those of 
the clergy, the army, the aristocracy, the landowning elites, the upper bourgeoi-
sie, the court, the Carlists and the Mauristas. All regarded a victory of the Central 
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Powers as a triumph for those who defended such Catholic and traditional val-
ues as monarchism, discipline, authority and a hierarchical social order.”25 These 
groups understood that siding with Germany was out of the question, and chose, 
as a result, to insist on the preservation of as strict a neutrality as possible. The 
exalted place of the army in the restoration system, enhanced by the Alfonso 
XIII’s identification with the corporation, as a result of his education, was actu-
ally the key factor in keeping Spain out of the war.26 Aware of its shortcomings 
and fearful of the social tensions that might be unleashed by participation in the 
conflict, the army – increasingly engaged in Morocco, in any case – preferred to 
stay out of the European conflagration, and was sufficiently powerful to impose 
its will.27 As the King’s position within the Canovist system was paramount, his 
views also mattered. Alfonso XIII initially settled upon the desire to play a medi-
ating role in the war but was sufficiently frightened by the Bolshevik triumph in 
Russia to move closer to a germanophile position, one which demanded a strict 
neutrality for Spain.28
Still, some dissenting voices could be heard, especially among those who 
also had no hope of taking power under the existing regime. Alejandro Lerroux’s 
Radical party, republicans and socialists believed that the war, being a mass event, 
would serve as a modernizing force, awakening the Spanish people as a whole and 
driving them to demand – in return for the military service and sacrifice – a more 
competent and fair system of government. But from more established circles 
could also be heard count Romanones’ voice, in his famous article “Neutralidades 
que matan”: “Neutrality unsupported by the neutral’s own force is at the mercy 
of the first strong state which finds it necessary to violate it […]The Balearic and 
the Canary islands, the Galician coasts are undefended […] If Germany wins, will 
she thank us for our neutrality? No, she will try to rule the Mediterranean.” The 
reaction to the article was negative, however, and Romanones momentarily dis-
tanced himself from its content. For much of his premiership, his interventionist 
instincts would be kept in check. The powerful conservative bloc was sufficiently 
powerful to again thwart Romanones, when, early in 1917, he adopted a more bel-
licose posture, warning Germany that the sinking of any more Spanish merchant 
vessels would lead him to break off diplomatic relations with Germany. In April 
of that year Alfonso XIII replaced Romanones by another Liberal, García Prieto. 
This prime minister understood that no change to Spain’s neutrality would be 
tolerated. 
What this contest of ideas did achieve was a further blow to the consensus 
politics that had run Spain in the Restoration period: If participation in the war, 
or neutrality, were indeed a matter of life and death for the country, then being in 
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power and having one's say heard and respected was more important than ever 
before. Politics was finally seen to matter. The debate on intervention lasted for 
the whole of the unexpectedly long conflict, occurring outside the Cortes, which 
were usually closed because the country, for the sake of order, was governed by 
emergency decrees. 
Having examined the interventionist debate in the four countries mentioned 
in the title, what conclusions can be drawn about their situation that might help 
our understanding of prewar situations, and the identification of the “interven-
tionist moment”? The first is that in all four countries the outbreak of war among 
the Great Powers was identified as a historically significant moment, a moment of 
enormous transformative potential. For these four insecure but ambitious coun-
tries, two old, two new, 1914 was a unique opportunity to reinvent themselves, 
to forge anew the bond that held citizens together, to right perceived historical 
wrongs by the force of arms and the purchase, through a blood sacrifice, of greater 
moral authority. This was true even in Portugal, where the young republican 
regime had cultivated since its inception an anti-militaristic rhetoric (although 
this was belied by continued military action in Africa, seen as a sphere apart). 
With every month that passed, this sentiment spurred those who shared it to 
ever more dramatic actions in search of their desired outcome. History was being 
made and they could not absent themselves from it. This is an attitude that we 
tend to associate, say, with Mussolini in 1940: but it was undeniably true of Mus-
solini in 1915, many other Italians, and interventionists all over southern Europe 
during the Great War.
The second conclusion is that war bred more war. All four countries had been 
involved in significant military conflicts in the recent past, and had no instinctive 
fear, or loathing, of it. There was as yet no clear identification of war as an evil 
in itself, whatever about the aforementioned official attitude in Portugal. In the 
Introduction to his Dynamic of Destruction, Alan Kramer writes, “in the seldom 
studied period 1911 to 1914, many of the ideas of a militant, sometimes racist, 
nationalism, were not only developed in theory but tried out in practice, start-
ing with Italy’s invasion of Libya and ending with the mass atrocities committed 
by all sides in the Balkan Wars’. One might tentatively extend this statement so 
as to encompass European colonial campaigns, such as those of Portugal and, in 
Morocco, Spain. A third conclusion is that it was not easy – except perhaps in 
Spain – to oppose the coming of war. In some cases, one did so at the risk of one’s 
life. The virulence of the language employed by interventionists was total (see, for 
example, D’Annunio’s speeches in May 1915), and their toleration of opposing 
arguments non-existent. To achieve their aims, interventionists rode roughshod 
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over any and all obstacles standing in their way, including the easily verifiable will 
of the nation. Moura Pinto, a Portuguese opposition deputy, stated in the secret 
sessions of the Chamber of Deputies, in July 1917: “The mystery of our interven-
tion in the European war and the mysterious way we brought it about, keeping 
the country in the most absolute ignorance of its fate, brought about the most 
frightening state of confusion registered in our History and was the sole source of 
hatreds which will never be extinguished within the present generation, compli-
cating, perhaps irrevocably, the country’s political problems.”29
Carr’s words, quoted at the start of this paper, give the idea of partially lib-
eral regimes destroyed by the war as hapless victims of external circumstances, 
but that is not as most of them should be viewed. Just as small countries had, in 
many ways, and through their rivalries and ambitions, helped to bring about the 
Great War, playing the Great Powers off against each other, so too intervention-
ists sowed the seeds of their – in some instances very rapid – demise by insisting 
on a course that not all in their respective countries agreed with, and which set 
them on a fundamentally undemocratic track. Coercion, censorship, accusations 
of treason, divisions and fractures of society were the new order of the day, during 
the “interventionist moment”, in order to overcome recalcitrant rivals and to force 
the majority of the population to endure the hardships of wartime.
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